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L Introduction

Statutory obsolescence is the fate of all legislation.' At some point in
the natural "life cycle" of any statute,2 courts tend to move from purposive
statutory construction, focused on the actual legislative intent, to greater
deference towards administrative expertise as they implicitly recognize that
the original legislative intent no longer fits the contemporary institutional
landscape. Given that the federal securities laws were passed during the
1930s, they have now entered the geriatric zone where their possible obsolescence must be considered. Some academics have already called for the
SEC's elimination on precisely this basis.' Practitioners complain about the
"metaphysical" and "hypertechnical" distinctions that the SEC's doctrinally
absorbed staff has developed, which arguably have little relationship to
public policy concerns or the needs of investors.4 Meanwhile, the SEC,
itself, appears to be administratively repealing some of the Securities Act of
1933's clearest prohibitions. 5 Independently, Congress seems intent on
"deregulating" the Securities Act of 1933, in part by making prospectus
delivery optional with the investor. 6
Although the idea that the federal securities laws need rejuvenation is
timely, it is not new. A well-known and widely respected model for updating the federal securities laws has existed for the past thirty years. In
1. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES
(1982) (arguing that courts should update obsolete statutes rather than remain faithful to their
out-of-date legislative intent); Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial
Process: The RevisionistRole of Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REv.
672 (1987).
2. For a discussion of statutory life cycles and shifting standards of judicial
interpretation, see GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 97 (1977).
3. See Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group
Formation,A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDozo L. REv. 909 (1994) (discussing
principles for determining agency obsolescence and applying principles to SEC); Jonathan
Macey, The SECDinosaurExpandsIts Turf, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 1992, at A12 (expressing
view that changes in securities markets have eliminated need for SEC).
4. For such a representative complaint, see Gerald S. Backman & Stephen E. Kim,
A Curefor Securities Act Metaphysics: Integrated Registration, INSIGHTS, May, 1995, at
18.
5. See infra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
6. See Mark Anderson, Republicans in House Begin Push To Overhaul U.S. Securities
Laws, WALL ST. J., July 27, 1995, at A2 (noting introduction of bill by Representative Jack
Fields, Chairman of House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance, that would
"ease rules that require investors to get a prospectus before making an investment"); Anita
Raghavan et al., GOP SecuritiesLaw Plan May Tilt Balance of Power, WALL ST. J., July 28,
1995, at Cl (discussing Fields bill).
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1966, Milton Cohen published what probably has become the most influential article ever written on the federal securities laws, Truth in Securities
Revisited. Cohen argued that the combined disclosure requirements of the
Securities Act of 1933 (the '33 Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(the '34 Act) produced pointless duplication. Had the statutes instead been
passed in the reverse order or as part of a single integrated statute, he
suggested that our disclosure system would have been structured very
differently. Because the '34 Act creates a system of continuous, periodic
disclosure, the existence of this system profoundly reduces the need for
transaction-specific disclosure at the time when an issuer later seeks to sell
its securities. Logically, a corporate issuer seeking to sell securities under
a continuous disclosure system would only be required to disclose any
additional material information that it had not previously disclosed pursuant
to the continuous disclosure system.
In modem terms, Milton Cohen's point was that the development of
securities regulation in the United States was "path dependent." Because the
'33 Act came first, it understandably keyed the timing of disclosure to the
issuer's sale of its securities. Later, the '34 Act overlaid a system of
company-specific disclosure on top of the '33 Act's system of transactionspecific disclosure. Had events occurred in the reverse order, no one would
have sought to overlay transaction-specific disclosure on top of companyspecific disclosure.
Although Milton Cohen's fundamental point - that our two principal
statutes governing securities regulation are not well integrated - has
received nearly universal acceptance, progress toward implementing his
vision has been slow and halting, at least until recently. Thirty years after
his article, serious administrative efforts have been made to integrate the '33
and '34 Acts, but their statutory structure has not been significantly altered.
Most notably, the American Law Institute (AL) labored for over a decade
on its Federal Securities Code, 8 an ambitious attempt to recodify all six
federal securities statutes into one seamless code. Almost everyone in the
field applauded this effort, accomplished under the magisterial direction of
Harvard Professor Louis Loss. Eventually, even the SEC endorsed this
approach, but when the ALI's Federal Securities Code was presented to
Congress in 1980, Congress essentially yawned and declined to act.
Unfortunately, "good government" reform does not excite powerful consti7.
8.

Milton H. Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340 (1966).
See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE (1980). For an

overview of early criticisms and reform efforts, see Louis Loss, The American Law Institute's
FederalSecurities Code Project, 25 Bus. LAw. 27 (1969).
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tuencies nor generate the level of emotion necessary to stir a lethargic
Congress into action.
During the 1980s, however, many of the essential ideas in Milton
Cohen's vision and the ALI's Code were implemented through SEC rulemaking to create an effectively integrated disclosure system.9 Modem concepts that today border on household words for the securities bar - such as
"incorporation by reference" and "shelf registration" - are in essence means
of implementing the vision of efficient statutory integration without legislation.
Full integration, however, was not achieved and, absent legislation,
arguably may never be fully achievable. Under a completely integrated disclosure system, registration under the '34 Act would suspend the obligation
to register issuances of securities under the '33 Act. To date, administrative
integration of the two statutes has stopped well short of this point - its
principal achievement being a shelf registration system under which issuers
can obtain quick access to the capital markets by incorporating by reference
0
'34 Act filings.'
There matters rested until 1995, when two things happened. First, the
SEC appointed an "Advisory Committee on the Capital Formation and Regulatory Processes" (Advisory Committee)," whose assigned tasks included
"evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of the regulatory process and the
disclosure requirements relating to the public offering of securities ... [and]
identifying and developing means to minimize costs imposed by current
regulatory programs." 2 Second, House Republicans introduced legislation
that would, among other things, substantially eliminate the prospectus delivery requirements of the '33 Act. 3 Competitive efforts at deregulation thus
9. See Edward F. Greene, Integrationof the Securities Act and the Exchange Act: A
Case Study of Regulation in the Division of Corporation Finance of the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission, 3 J. COMP. CoRp. L. & SEC. RFG. 75, 79-90 (1981).

10. Shelf registration is governed by Rule 415. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (1995). Rule
415(a)(1)(x) allows an issuer to register securities "to be offered and sold on a continuous or
delayed basis" if the issuer qualifies for Form S-3 or Form F-3. Currently, domestic issuers
(which must use Form S-3) must have not less than $75 million in aggregate market value of
their common stock held by non-affiliates to qualify to use such form. See Form S-3, General
Instruction I(B)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 239.13(b)(1) (1995).
11. See Advisory Committee on the Capital Formation and Regulatory Processes,
Securities Act Release No. 7135, Exchange Act Release 36,368, 1995 WL 71378 (Feb. 13,
1995).
12. Id. at *2.
13. For a summary of the bill, introduced by Congressman Jack Fields (R. Tex.),
Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance, see Anderson,
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appear to be underway. Whether they will produce a race to the top or to
the bottom is debatable, but little about the process of legislative drafting
suggests that legislatures can outperform a sophisticated administrative
agency.
Against this backdrop, this Article will examine both
how integration.
of the two Acts should be pursued and what its consequences likely will be.
Different paths to implementation are possible and carry very different
implications. In particular, the goals underlying a company registration
system are multiple. For some, the aim is not simply to integrate the '33
and '34 Acts, but also to integrate public and private markets as well to end
the current system of complex and uncertain exemptions from registration
under the '33 Act. At this point, the trade-offs become more complicated.
This Article will argue that, although the complexity surrounding affiliate
resales of issuer securities can safely be reduced, the private placement
exemption has continuing value. In particular, private sales to institutional
investors might constitute a preferable vehicle by which securities of some
issuers should reach the public market, with institutional investors undertaking some of the risk-taking and due diligence functions formerly
performed by underwriters.
In overview, a mismatch has developed between the '33 Act and the
system of shelf registration that corporate issuers prefer. Long-term shelf
registration contemplates that securities will dribble into the market in small
and discontinuous trickles. Offerings on such a reduced scale mesh poorly
with the '33 Act, which presupposes large and deliberately planned issuances - in fact, they fit about as well as the proverbial round peg and square
hole. Meanwhile, market developments have increased the utility of shelf
registration to the issuer. First, increased volatility in the equity markets has
made issuers more sensitive to short-term timing considerations and more
eager to exploit short-lived market windows.14 Second, empirical research
has repeatedly demonstrated that announcements of proposed stock offerings
will usually elicit a negative stock price reaction."1 Dribbling securities into
supra note 6 and Raghavan, supra note 6. One provision in this bill would limit the current
statutory obligation to deliver a prospectus (see 15 U.S.C. § 77(e)(b) (1994)) to persons who
actually request a prospectus. See Anderson, supra note 6; Raghavan, supra note 6.
14. The significance of this increase in the volatility of the equity markets is hotly
debated. Some believe that inefficient "noise trading" has increased because of the decline
in trading transaction costs. Others see increased volatility as largely limited to the 1987
stock market crash. See Paul G. Mahoney, Is There A Cure for "Excessive" Trading?, 81
VA. L. REV. 713, 730-32 (1995).
15. See, e.g., Paul Asquith & David W. Mullins, Equity Issuers and Offerings Dilution,
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the market in smaller installments may mitigate this problem. Third, the
dividing line between private and public transactions has blurred, and issuers
are finding it increasingly useful to structure transactions as private placements but with an immediately available shelf registration for resale by the
purchasers. 16
Yet, if there are thus reasons to encourage shelf registration, there is
clearly insufficient time available in a shelf registration for traditional due
diligence procedures to be conducted before each individual offering. In
addition, plausible public policy arguments can be made that transaction
costs need to be minimized so that equity issuances are not discouraged. If
so, many of the assumptions underlying the '33 Act may need to be rethought in this context if the law is to accommodate a marketplace capable
of handling repetitive, small issuances. In particular, one might reasonably
focus on (1) the level of responsibility, and liability, that can be realistically
placed on outside directors; (2) the nature of the investigation that the
underwriters can conduct under severe time constraints; (3) the degree to
which enhancement of the '34 Act's continuous disclosure system can substitute for transaction-specific '33 disclosure; and (4) likely judicial reactions
to administrative attempts to relax the '33 Act's requirements. Needless to
add, none of these themes have escaped the attention of the powerful interest
groups who will be affected by changes in our disclosure system.
Although this Article starts from the premise that the integration of the
'33 and '34 Acts makes sense, it must be underscored at the outset that the
context has changed dramatically since Milton Cohen wrote in 1966. In
general, most major changes enhance the relevance and logic of his prescription, but they also suggest the need for modifications that reflect developments that he could not possibly have anticipated in 1966. Four such
developments stand out. First and most notably, Milton Cohen could not
have foreseen in 1966 the dramatic growth of institutional investors, who
have more than doubled the percentage of equity that they hold so that today
their holdings represent the majority of the equity in U.S. publicly-held

15 J. FIN. EcON. 61 (1986); Michael J. Barclay & Robert H. Litzenberger, Announcement
Effects of New Equity Issues and the Use of IntradayPriceData, 21 J. FIN. ECON. 71 (1988).
Most commentators attribute this phenomenon to an inference made by investors that if

management wishes to sell stock then the current stock must be overpriced. A related theory
is that underwriters underprice the offering as compensation for the risk of negligence-based
liability that they must assume under the federal securities laws. See Seha M. Tinic, Anatomy
of Initial Public Offerings of Common Stock, 43 J. FIN. 789 (1989).

16. These are called "PIPE transactions" (for "private investment, public equity"). See
Stanley Keller, Basic Securities Concepts Revisited, INSIGHTS, May 1995, at 5, 7.
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corporations.17 Some believe their rise, along with related
developments,
18
may eventually make the role of the underwriter obsolete.
Second, the balance between the primary market and the secondary
market has shifted even more dramatically in the direction of secondary
trading. SEC staff estimates provided to the Advisory Committee show that
secondary market trading exceeds primary market issuances by nearly a 100
to 1 margin.19 As the secondary market increasingly overshadows the primary market, the '33 Act's preoccupation with the primary market and the
unique protections it gives the relatively few investors who buy in primary
markets seems anomalous. Increasingly, the '33 Act is becoming peripheral,
not central, to modem securities regulation.
Third, the development and acceptance of modem finance theory - in
particular the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (ECMH) - has shifted
the focus of disclosure from the individual to the market. 2, With the
Supreme Court's acceptance of the "fraud on the market" doctrine in Basic,
Inc. v. Levinson,2 1 regulators and practitioners now tend in common to
assume, perhaps prematurely, that disclosure to the market should satisfy all
disclosure obligations.
A final factor suggesting the statutory obsolescence of the '33 Act
involves the behavior of the SEC staff who interpret and enforce it. Increasingly, they appear to be treating several of the fundamental pillars of the '33
Act as outmoded and have proposed rules or interpretations that effectively
downsize them. Statutory norms that only a decade ago were treated as
17. For a summary of the equity holdings of institutional investors, see John C. Coffee,
The SEC and the InstitutionalInvestor: A Half-Time Report, 15 CARDOZO L. RaV. 837, 848

(1994) (noting that institutional investors held 23% of equity in 1955, 38% in 1981, and now

hold over 50%).
18. See Donald C. Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of Securities
Regulation, 98 HARv. L. RaV. 747, 750-63 (1985).
19. An SEC staff estimate provided to the Advisory Committee placed the volume of
annual secondary trading of equity common stock at $4 trillion and primary issuances at $50
to 100 billion - nearly a 100 to 1 ratio.
20. Shelf registration was indeed a legitimate child of this intellectual paradigm shift.
See Shelf Registration, Securities Act Release No. 6499 and Exchange Act Release No.
20,384, [1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,449, at 86,335, 86,339 (Nov.
17, 1983) (noting that integrated disclosure "recognizets] the applicability of the efficient

market theory to those companies which provide a steady stream of high quality corporate
information to the marketplace and whose corporate information is widely disseminated").
For an overview of finance theory's effect on securities regulation, see Lawrence A.
Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes:The Linear Genealogy of the Efficient
CapitalMarket Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 546 (1994).
21. 485 U.S. 224, 241-47 (1988).
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inviolate are now being distinguished away when policy reasons suggest that
compliance with them would be costly. If the high priests of securities
law - the staff of the SEC - have lost faith in the old dogma, the question
naturally arises whether others should still adhere to the old dogma's
premises. Thus, as a prelude to a discussion of the appropriate scope of the
'33 Act, Part I of this Article will survey the degree to which the old order
of securities regulation is rapidly changing.
Part II will then proceed to examine how a "company registration"
model might operate. Here, important differences result depending upon
whether such an approach is sought to be implemented by legislation or by
administrative rulemaking. If the latter approach is pursued, there may be
less danger of a "runaway" Congress overreacting and effectively nullifying
the federal securities laws, but the level of liability that results from administrative integration may be undesirable. The trade-offs are problematic. As
a result, proceeding by means of administrative rule-making may also
require supplemental and alternative forms of deregulation.
Part III turns to the issue of liability. However well designed a company registration system may be, few companies may voluntarily convert to
it if its adoption implies increased exposure to liabilities under the federal
securities laws. To what extent can liability be appropriately reduced or
refocused? To the extent that it cannot be administratively relaxed, other
approaches may also be necessary as at least a supplement to company registration.
In that light, Part IV explores the special, and possibly twilight, status
of private markets and the private placement exemption under such an integrated "company" registration system. Here, the claim will be examined
that institutional investors may be able to perform much of the gatekeeper
function formerly performed by underwriters in traditional fixed-price
underwritings. Phrased in Milton Cohen's terms, had institutional investors
existed or been contemplated in 1933 and 1934, the structure of the federal
securities laws might also have looked very different.
II. Obsolescence and the '33 Act: The Old Order Slowly Changeth
Stripped to its essentials, the '33 Act pivots around Section 5, which
contains three critical statutory injunctions. First, prior to the filing of its
registration statement, the issuer may not solicit buyers, either orally or in
writing, or otherwise seek to condition the market (the "gun jumping prohibition").' Second, after the filing of its registration statement, the issuer may
22. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1994).
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use only the preliminary prospectus contained in its registration statement
and no other form of written communication to solicit investors, at least until
its registration statement is declared effective by the SEC (the "free writing
prohibition").' Third, after the registration statement is declared effective,
underwriters and dealers are required to deliver a copy of the final prospectus to the buyer at or before the time that the buyer receives either a
confirmation of sale or the share certificates (the "prospectus delivery
requirement").' Collectively, these three constraints effectively create a
period of enforced silence before the offering begins and then give an
informational monopoly to the SEC-approved prospectus. Their common
purpose is to force the company to market its securities principally by means
of the disclosure document prepared in accordance with the SEC's rules and
subjected to prior review by the SEC's staff. The obvious premise to
Section 5 was that if investors could receive glossy, promotional literature
from the issuer, they might pay little attention to the dull, formalistic
prospectus prepared in accordance with the rules of a government agency.
Understandably, the government is not as slick, persuasive, or enticing as
Madison Avenue, and thus, if its mandated disclosure document is to receive
investor attention, the state needs a monopoly for at least a limited period on
access to the investor. Section 5 essentially provides that monopoly, both
by prohibiting "gun-jumping" (i.e., solicitations prior to the filing of the
registration statement) and by barring any written communications during the
waiting period that could compete with the SEC-filed preliminary prospectus
for the investor's attention (i.e., "free writing").
Yet, within the last two years, the long-established equilibrium created
by these provisions has been disrupted by major SEC staff initiatives that
seem in the aggregate to be undercutting the doctrinal foundations on which
the '33 Act rests. The clearest example has been the SEC's reversal this
year of its traditional position on "gun jumping." In the past, not only has
the Commission precluded any attempt to solicit or condition the market
prior to the filing of a registration statement, but it has deemed attempts to
ascribe value to the issuer's securities or to estimate the worth of its assets
as such a solicitation in violation of Section 5(c).' In a series of releases,
23. See id. § 77e(b)(1).
24. See id. §§ 77d(3), 77e(b)(2).
25. See In re Carl Loeb, Rhoades & Co., 38 S.E.C. 843, 848-51 (1959). See also
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569, 574-76 (2d Cir. 1970); SEC
v. Arvida Corp., 169 F. Supp. 211,215 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). For a general discussion, see Eric
A. Chiappinelli, Gun Jumping: The Problemof Extraneous Offers of Securities, 50 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 457 (1989) (proposing that pre-filing offers of securities should be permitted in light
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the Commission previously drew a not-always-clear line between those forms
of preregistration publicity that were permitted and those that were not."
Still, no doubt existed that direct attempts to solicit the investor would not
be tolerated.
Then, this year in Securities Act Release No. 7188,' the Commission
reversed itself by proposing a new rule - proposed Rule 135(d) - that
would allow issuers contemplating initial public offerings to solicit indications of interest from potential investors priorto the filing of a registration
statement. This proposed rule goes well beyond tolerating some market
conditioning through public disclosures and expressly permits direct solicitations, both through oral solicitations and through written communications.
Its rationale is that the issuer may need to "test the waters" and evaluate the
feasibility of a public offering before committing itself to the possibly substantial costs of registration.
Surprisingly, proposed Rule 135(d) is not limited to the solicitation of
institutional investors or other sophisticated purchasers, but would broadly
authorize the marketing of the issuer's stock to small and unsophisticated
purchasers as well. Indeed, even use of a public media, including radio and
television, is permitted. This extraordinary tolerance seems unnecessary if
the alleged need is just. to evaluate the feasibility of an offering. Presumably, an issuer needing a market reaction to its proposed offering could
get such a sense from a relatively quick canvass of underwriters and/or
institutional investors, who as sophisticated, repeat players could compare
the proposed offering with other comparable deals or with their own
standard investment criteria. This could be done without authorizing a broad
public solicitation of more susceptible individual investors, who in truth have
of modem finance theory).
26. See Publication of Information and Delivery of Prospectus by Broker-Dealer Prior
to or After Filing of a Registration Statement, Securities Act Release No. 5010 and Exchange
Act Release No. 8710, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,743, at
83,702 (Oct. 7, 1969); Publication of Information Prior to or After the Filing and Effective
Date of a Registration Statement, Securities Act Release No. 5009, [1969 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,744, at 83,705 (Oct. 7, 1969); Guidelines for the Release of
Information by Issuers Whose Securities Are in Registration, Securities Act Release No.
5180, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)

78,192, at 80,578 (Aug. 16,

1971). In addition, SEC Rules 135 through 139 permit the issuer to publish certain notices
and allow broker-dealers to circulate certain research reports and analyses without being
deemed to have made an offer in violation of § 5(c). 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.135 to 230.139
(1995).

27. See Solicitations of Interest Prior to an Initial Public Offering, Securities Act
Release No. 7188, [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII)

(June 27, 1995) (proposing new Rule 135(d)).

85,639, at 86,885
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little advice or expertise to offer the issuer. Moreover, once unsophisticated
investors are approached and decide they are interested in the offering, they
may have little reason thereafter to read the formal prospectus once the
registration statement is filed. After all, this was precisely the logic that led
the draftsmen of the '33 Act to write Section 5(c) so as to forbid pre-filing
solicitations of any kind (oral or written). Yet, the proposed rule would
permit a general solicitation of all investors, even by such public means as
the press, media, television, and the Internet.
In short, although limited to the initial public offering context, the
proposal represents a major retreat from the old orthodoxy, which insisted
that the prospectus be the only selling document that the investor saw prior
to the effectiveness of the registration statement. At bottom, this reversal
suggests that the staff may agree with those critics who believe that Section 5(c) is an anachronism in light of modem finance theory.'
Nor does this example stand alone. Section 5(b) of the '33 Act also
prohibits the use of any written offering materials prior to the sending of the
final prospectus. Again, the purpose is to ensure that investors read the
prospectus, instead of other promotional materials. However, in several
recent no-action letters, the SEC's staff has permitted the use of certain
written materials prior to the sending of the final prospectus.29 Admittedly,
this new tolerance of "free writing" is limited to the context of specialized
asset-backed deals and authorizes only the use of "term sheets" and "computational materials." In all likelihood, the potential for harm is small, but in
doctrinal terms the loophole thus administratively opened could over time be
enlarged to become a triumphal arch for issuers who wish to use offering
materials other than the statutory prospectus. The relevant point for present
purposes is that the SEC staff again has shown itself willing to grant
exemptions on policy grounds, where in the past it almost certainly would
have said that it lacked discretion because its hands were tied by the statutory
language.
Another example is the Commission's recent expansion of Rule 430A
and its adoption of new Rule 434, which collectively seem to abandon the
28. See Chiappinelli, supra note 25, at 497-501 (arguing that modem financial theories
support proposal to allow extraneous offers). However, it should be noted that the proposed
rule applies only to the initial public offering context, which by definition is not an efficient
market, but rather one in which offering prices are determined by negotiation between the
issuer and its underwriters without a prior trading history.
29. See Distribution of Certain Written Materials Relating to Asset-Backed Securities,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1995 WL 96251, at *6 (Mar. 7, 1995); Kidder Peabody Acceptance
Corp. I, SEC No-Action Letter, 1994 WL 200784, at *5 (May 17, 1994).
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traditional idea of a single integrated prospectus in favor of a stream of documents from the issuer. Adopted in 1992, Rule 430A ° permits the issuer to
omit the public offering price and underwriting discounts, as well as information about the underwriting syndicate, from the final prospectus,
provided that this information is later filed with the Commission within five

business days." In 1995, the Commission expanded this approach significantly by extending the post-effectiveness period during which a prospectus
supplement containing pricing and other related information can be later filed
from five to fifteen business days.32 More importantly, the Commission also

adopted Rule 434 in 1995, permitting issuers to convey the required prospectus information in multiple documents delivered to investors at different
times, rather than in a traditional, integrated final prospectus. 33 This abandonment of the traditional integrated prospectus may well be justified by new

cost considerations,'

but it shows an agency largely indifferent to the

traditional '33 Act concept of a single disclosure document and willing to

accept information being provided to it after the time of sale to the investor.
The aggregate significance of these changes is debatable, but they leave

the SEC at an unstable transitional point. Once cost considerations to issuers
30. See Rule 430A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.430A (1995); Simplification of Registration
Procedures for Primary Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 6964, [1992
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,653 (Oct. 26, 1992).
31. See Rule 430A(a)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 230.430A(a)(3) (1995). Unfortunately, this
relaxation may permit "coercive" rights offerings in which shareholders face dilution if they
fail to subscribe. In 1991, Time Warner attempted a sliding-scale subscription offering in
which the price investors would pay rose as a higher percentage of shareholders subscribed.
As originally proposed, the offering price could range from the low $60s to over $100 per
share, with the lower price applying if few shareholders subscribed. Thus, if most
shareholders refused to purchase, those few who did subscribe would receive a very attractive
price that diluted existing shareholders. The SEC objected to the transaction because it failed
to disclose in the prospectus the exact price at which investors would purchase. See Anne
Schwimmer, Rights Deal Had Funds Up in Arns, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Jan. 6, 1992,
at 27. Yet, under the latest SEC rules, an issuer can delay disclosure of the offering price
until after the offering; hence, coercion may now work.
32. See Prospectus Delivery; Securities Transactions Settlement, Securities Act Release
No. 7168, [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,620, at 86,563 (May 11,
1995).
33. See id. at 86,570.
34. The principal justification cited by the SEC in Securities Act Release No. 7168 was
the time constraint imposed by the shift to T+3 settlement date, which made it more difficult
for underwriters to print and mail out final prospectuses. Id. at 86,563-64. Understandable
as this concern is, it does balance the investor's need for disclosure against the costs to the
issuer and underwriters. Such balancing inevitably places the SEC on the proverbial slippery
slope.

RE-ENGINEERING CORPORATE DISCLOSURE

1155

and underwriters justify material administrative modifications of the statutory
framework, most anything becomes possible, and predictably, the issuer and
underwriter community will lobby for whatever relief they think is politically
possible.
III. Toward Company Registration
A. An Overview of Company Registration
The core idea in company registration is that eligible companies should
be able to make offers and sales of securities without submitting to a costly
transaction registration process. Prospectus content - and, indeed, the use
of any recognizable "prospectus" - would be determined by marketing
needs and the general antifraud obligation to make full and fair disclosure of
material information, instead of by a predetermined formula prescribed in
the instructions to an SEC-mandated form of prospectus. Once a company
became eligible for company registration, it would register under the '34 Act
and thereafter file periodic reports under it. Routine financings would be
consummated without any further '33 Act registration, and any prospectus
that was in fact prepared for marketing purposes would be shaped by marketing needs, plus, of course, the antifraud rules of the '34 Act.
For issuers, the advantages to such a system are obvious. First, it eliminates the delay inherent both in preparing and in filing a registration
statement, as well as in waiting for SEC approval and "effectiveness." This
delay may cause the issuer to miss what it perceives as market "windows"
of opportunity. Second, the various prophylactic rules surrounding the '33
Act drop out of the picture. Gone are both the period of enforced silence
mandated by the "gun jumping" prohibition of Section 5(c) and the prohibition on "free writing" in Section 5(b). Third, although some form of a prospectus might well continue to be used as a marketing necessity, the absolute
right of rescission that the '33 Act gives an investor who does not receive a
prospectus prior to the mailing of a confirmation of sale or share delivery
would also cease to apply.3 5 Fourth, communications between the issuer and
the investor would no longer be filtered through the SEC, with arguably
some information loss in terms of the issuer's ability to explain itself in the
manner that it considers most effective.

35. This rescission right is conferred by § 12(1) for any violation of § 5. See Securities
Act of 1933 § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1994). In addition, an informal prospectus that was
not filed as part of the registration statement would seemingly not come within the scope of
§ 12(2). See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061 (1995).
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Finally, because of significant differences in the liability provisions of
'33
and '34 Acts, the issuer would enjoy a substantial reduction in both
the
its exposure and that of its officers and directors under a company registration system. Under the '33 Act, the issuer is subject to strict liability for
material misstatements or omissions in its registration statement, 36 and its
directors and principal senior executives are subject to a negligence-based
form of liability under which they carry the burden of proving that they
conducted a reasonable investigation of, and had a reasonable belief in, the
accuracy of most statements made in the registration statement.37 In contrast, under the '34 Act, the only relevant express provision is Section 18,
which applies only to reports filed with the SEC and requires that the
investor actually rely on the alleged misstatement; for these reasons, it has
long been regarded as an ineffective weapon for plaintiffs.3 1 Injured investors can, of course, sue under Rule lOb-5 for misleading statements made
to the market, but here proof of scienter is required and persons who aid or
abet the violation have no civil liability after a recent Supreme Court decision. 39 As a practical matter, secondary participants, such as officers and
directors, face only a remote risk of personal liability under the '34 Act for
materially misleading statements or omissions made by the issuer.
These benefits to the issuer from a company registration system may be
counterbalanced, however, by corresponding costs to investors. Chief
among these costs is the danger that there may be an erosion in the quality
of disclosure, at least to the degree that disclosure is driven by the fear of
liability. Here, the perspectives of lawyers and economists tend to deviate.
Economists, focusing more on the issuer's need to attract capital at the
lowest possible cost, argue that market forces will be sufficient to maintain
disclosure quality. Practicing lawyers, on the other hand, almost uniformly
36. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1994). Section 1l(b) gives
an elaborate due diligence defense, but only to defendants "other than the issuer." Id.
§ 77k(b).
37. For the fullest description of this defense in the context of an actual case, see Escott
v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 682-703 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The defense varies
significantly depending upon whether the alleged misstatement or omission relates to a section
of the registration statement prepared by an expert. Id. at 683-84.
38. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1994). To state a
claim under § 18, a plaintiff must plead that it purchased or sold a security in actual reliance
on a specifically identified document'filed with the SEC. See Ross v. A.H. Robbins Co., 607
F.2d 545, 552-53 (2d Cir. 1979); Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 916 (2d Cir. 1968). Thus,
the "fraud on the market" doctrine, which has simplified plaintiffs' burdens under Rule 1Ob-5,
does not apply to § 18.
39. See Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
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believe this analysis oversimplifies. The issuer's incentive to raise capital,
they argue, is not constant, but episodic.- Liability drives disclosure, they
recognize, because managers often have interests that conflict with those of
the corporation that cause them to suppress the disclosure of some negative
information. Probably every experienced securities attorney has experienced
this reluctance first hand.
From their more institutionally sensitive perspective, securities attorneys also raise a second common theme: '34 Act filings receive relatively
low-level attention within the corporation, and interim filings, such as the
Form 10-Q and the Form 8-K, tend not to be reviewed by the corporation's
outside professionals. Even the corporation's outside independent accountant tends to focus on the annual audited financial statements and to overlook
the interim quarterly reports. In contrast, '33 Act filings receive closer
attention and more outside review. Traditionally, '33 Act due diligence was
vastly superior to the limited due diligence performed on '34 Act filings by
corporate insiders. However, with the partial integration of the federal
securities laws effected by shelf registration, there has been increasing convergence between the '33 and '34 Acts' requirements and decreasing due
diligence in connection with '33 Act filings.
Moving to a company registration system does not; however, inevitably
entail acceptance of lower quality disclosure. Two basic approaches seem
possible to enhance the quality of the existing periodic disclosure system.
A substantive approach could require enhancements in the nature of the disclosures that must be made under the '34 Act. Alternatively, a procedural
approach could impose additional requirements on the corporation's gatekeepers - its accountants, directors, attorneys, and other outside professionals - to upgrade the character of the due diligence review they give to
the corporation's periodic filings. Both approaches have been discussed in
detail at Advisory Committee meetings. Neither approach, however, is costfree, and any significant new requirement is likely to elicit some controversy.
Two other sets of issues that will necessarily arise in the course of
formulating any concrete proposal are also likely to generate controversy.
The first involves eligibility for inclusion within the system: Should any
company which registers under the '34 Act be eligible, or should eligibility
be restricted to some narrower class of companies whose boundaries are
more or less co-extensive with the contours of market efficiency? The
second issue involves the best means of implementation: Should (or can)
company registration be implemented through administrative rule-making,
or is legislation necessary? As will be seen, the issue is not simply whether
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Congress can be convinced to act, but whether an administrative system
carries with it hidden costs in the form of increased liabilities.
It is easiest to approach these issues by first reviewing what the SEC has
already done to move towards administrative implementation and then
assessing what it could do further.
B. SEC Integrationof the '33 and '34 Acts
For decades, the '33 and '34 Acts were administered independently and
seemingly almost in oblivion of each other. Not only was duplicative information required under each, but the manner of its required presentation was
different and terms used in common by both Acts were defined differently
by each. Contemporaneously with the progress of the ALI Federal Securities Code during the late 1970s, the Commission began to pursue equivalency between transactional reporting under the '33 Act and periodic
reporting under the '34 Act. n The Commission's basic strategy was to make
the periodic reports filed under the '34 Act contain disclosure equivalent to
that which would be in a '33 Act prospectus, and then to allow certain
widely followed companies to incorporate by reference the information from
their periodic reports into their prospectuses at the time they made a subsequent public offering.
The last step in this process was shelf registration. For decades, the
SEC had resisted shelf registration of securities in excess of the amount that
the issuer then intended to offer, for fear that advance registration would
mean stale prospectuses." Integration of the '33 and '34 Acts solved this
problem, at least in theory, because by incorporating subsequently filed '34
Act reports the prospectus would remain current. In 1983, the Commission
accepted the arguments for shelf registration and broadened Rule 415 to
permit an issuer to register up to approximately ten percent of its voting
40. The course of the transition is recounted in Proposed Comprehensive Revision to
System for Registration of Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 6235, [1980
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,649, at 83,484-90 (Sept. 2, 1980). See also
Greene, supra note 9, at 76-94 (describing program designed to integrate information
furnished by company under Exchange Act into registration statements required by Securities

Act).
41. There was also a doctrinal obstacle. Section 6(a) of the '33 Act states: "A
registration statement shall be deemed effective only as to the securities specified therein as
proposed to be offered." Securities Act of 1933 § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77f(a) (1994). Early
on, the SEC took the view that registration of more securities than were presently intended
to be offered would be misleading. See In re Shawnee Chiles Syndicate, 10 S.E.C. 109, 113
(1941) (noting significance of assuring investors that registration statement and prospectus
provide current information).
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stock for sale in delayed "at the market" offerings.' However, the issuer
was required to certify that it "reasonably expected to... [offer and sell the
amount so registered] within two years from the initial effective date of the
registration. "I4
Operationally, shelf registration meant that stock could be registered for
up to two years in advance of its sale, with the incorporation of subsequently
filed '34 Act reports being relied upon to keep the document current. Thus,
in theory, issuers and underwriters did not need to worry about the delay,
cost, and uncertainty incident to registration and SEC review because the
stock could be pre-registered and sold on literally a moment's notice when
market windows later appeared. Of course, the prospectus largely deteriorated into a legal fiction as a result of this transition. Only the one or two
page summary table at the front of the typical Form S-3 registration
statement is today coherent to the average investor. Shelf registration and
incorporation by reference really implied that disclosure to the market
through '34 filings replaced disclosure to individual investors through
prospectuses.
In reality, shelf registration signaled the future supremacy of the '34
Act over the '33 Act. Thereafter, the Form 10-K became the principal disclosure filing and the prospectus became an appendage to it.
C. Limitationson AdministrativeIntegration
Reports of the death of the '33 Act can be exaggerated. In truth,
important and often cumbersome vestigial remnants of the '33 Act survive
to complicate and possibly confound efforts at administrative integration.
Three obstacles stand out:, the prospectus delivery obligations of Section 5,
the strict and vicarious liability provisions of Section 11, and the uncertain limitations of Section 6 on shelf registration. Collectively, they may
preclude full integration of the two statutes through administrative rulemaking.
First, Section 5(b) of the '33 Act requires the sending of a final prospectus to at least the initial purchasers of shares under a registration statement. Effectively, this delivery obligation has already been relaxed by Rule
174, which, in the case of reporting companies, suspends the obligation for
42. See Registration of Securities - Self Registration - Rule Adoption, Securities Act
Release No. 6499, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,499, at

86,335 (Nov. 17, 1983).

For the 10% limitation, see Rule 415(a)(4)(ii), 17 C.F.R.

§ 230.415(a)(4)(ii) (1995).
43. Rule 415(a)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 230.415(a)(2) (1995).
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dealers who are not members of the selling group to deliver prospectuses.'
Yet, prospectus delivery remains an obligation for underwriters with unsold
allotments. From a policy perspective, the prospectus delivery requirement
seems an anachronism because the modem Form S-3 prospectus used in
shelf registrations provides little intelligible information to the investors.
If the prospectus delivery requirement seems outdated, the liability
provisions of the '33 Act are far more significant. Section 11 of the '33 Act
imposes strict liability on the issuer and a form of vicarious liability for
negligence on officers, directors, experts, underwriters and others. In
addition, Section 12(2) creates negligence-based liability for those persons
in privity with the purchaser, typically the underwriters. Thus, although '34
Act filings are the primary disclosure documents today, the incorporation by
reference of '34 Act filings into the prospectus seemingly means that these
documents now carry strict liability for the issuer. 45 To some probably
minor extent, exemptive rules have softened this liability in the case of
directors,' but no rule softens the risk of strict liability for the company
whose '34 Act filings, prior or subsequent to the registration statement's
filing, will be incorporated by reference.
Third, Section 6 of the '33 Act places .uncertain limits on shelf registration. Shelf registration was long disfavored by the Commission, in part
because of the statutory obstacle posed by the last sentence of Section 6(a),
which states that: "A registration statement shall be deemed effective only
as to the securities specified therein as proposed to be offered."4 7 Early on,
the SEC took the view that registration of more securities than were
presently intended to be offered would be misleading.' When modem shelf
registration was introduced in 1983, the SEC rationalized an end run around
this doctrinal obstacle. Rule 415 today permits the issuer to register for "at
44. Rule 174 suspends the delivery obligation in the case of reporting companies for
dealers, who are required to make delivery for specified periods by § 4(3) of the '33 Act, but
does not apply to the unsold allotments of underwriters and selling group members. See Rule
174(t), 17 C.F.R. § 230.174(f) (1995).
45. There is some debate among practitioners as to whether § 11 liability actually
applies to interim '34 Act filings, but all agree that it applies to the annual report on Form
10-K. See infra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
46. See Rule 176, 17 C.F.I. § 230.176 (1995). Rule 176 says only that some specified
factors are "relevant circumstances" for purposes of determining if a person has satisfied his
or her due diligence defense under § 11 (c) of the '33 Act. The rule appears not to have been
interpreted by any case and is largely considered ineffective by the bar. See infra note 90 and
accompanying text.
47. Securities Act of 1933 § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77f(a) (1994).
48. See In re Shawnee Chiles Syndicate, 10 S.E.C. 109, 113 (1941).
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the market" offerings only that amount that "is reasonably expected to be
offered and sold within two years from the initial effective date of the
registration," 49 and in no event more than ten percent of its voting stock.' A
full-scale company registration would eliminate both the two year and ten
percent limitations, allowing the registration statement to be permanently
"evergreen" and to register all the securities authorized to be issued under
one or more classes. However, it remains uncertain whether the Commission has authority to dispense with Section 6(a) in this cursory fashion.
A related and even more technical problem surrounds Section 6(b) of
the '33 Act, which mandates a filing fee "at the time of filing" of the
registration statement equal to "one twenty-ninth of 1 per centum of the maximum aggregate price at which such securities are proposed to be offered. "51
If an "evergreen" registration statement were to cover all authorized but
unissued shares, the filing fee would be prohibitively inflated if the current
market value of the stock were used; even then, it would be impossible to
specify the actual offering price in the future. This language again suggests
that the '33 Act as originally drafted never contemplated long-term shelf
registration. Of course, legal fictions might be used: The fee might be
based, for example, on the par value of the stock at the time of the filing, at
least when no immediate offering was intended. This initial nominal fee
could later be supplemented based on the actual offering price as individual
offerings occurred. Does such a solution comply with the statute? Much
depends on the degree of discretion the courts will give the SEC to relax the
statute's commands and who they will recognize as having standing to
object.
Of these problems, the prospectus delivery requirement is probably the
easiest to address and solve. The term "prospectus" is broadly defined by
Section 2(10) of the '33 Act to include, among other things, the confirmation
of sale.' Dealers will always mail a confirmation of sale even if SEC rules'
did not require them to do so, because under state law the receipt of the
confirmation of sale by the customer solves the dealer's statute of frauds
problem (unless the purchaser objects within a specified number of days after
its receipt). 53 Thus, because the confirmation of sale both cannot be elimi49. Rule 415(a)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 230.415(a)(2) (1995).
50. See Rule 415(a)(4)(ii), 17 C.F.R. § 230.415(a)(4)(ii) (1995).

51. Securities Act of 1933 § 6(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77f(b) (1994) (as amended by Pub. L.
No. 103-121, 107 Stat. 1153, 1168-69 (1993) and Pub. L. No. 103-352, 108 Stat. 3148

(1994)).
52. See Securities Act of 1933 § 2(10), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1994).
53. The statute of frauds makes an oral transaction for the purchase of securities above
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nated and is already defined to be a prospectus, it could serve as the actual
statutory prospectus. SEC rules could provide that a legend set forth on the
back of the confirmation of sale, incorporating by reference the issuer's
recent '34 Act filings, would qualify the confirmation of sale as a Section 10(a) prospectus.
One qualification to this analysis must be noted. Section 7(a) of the '33
Act requires that a registration contain the information specified on
Schedule A to the '33 Act. Much of this information is transaction-specific
to the particular offering and is not contained in '34 Act filings (for example,
underwriting discounts). If this information must be set forth in the
registration statement, then the confirmation of sale would have to do more
than simply incorporate '34 Act filings - it would have to include those
items on Schedule A that had not previously been disclosed. In fact, however, there are several routes around this problem. Transaction-specific
information about the offering could be set forth in a voluntary Form 8-K
offering, which would be incorporated by reference. Or, the Commission
could act pursuant to Sections 7(a) and 10(a)(4) of the '33 Act to "provide
that... such information... need not be included in respect of" a defined
class of eligible issuers.' 5 Still another possibility is electronic disclosure
through entry on a computer system to which the investor has access. 56 In
any event, to the extent that the confirmation of sale will reach the typical
investor after the investment decision, it is not clear that any information at
this stage has much value. Put more simply, the anachronistic reality of the
'33 Act is that it permits after-the-fact disclosure at a time when few will pay
attention.
Although the prospectus delivery obligation can probably be abolished
administratively by any of several routes, the cost to the issuer in these
techniques is that they all seemingly extend Section 11 liability to all '34 Act
a defined dollar level unenforceable in most U.S. jurisdictions. Usually, the writing must be
signed by the party to be charged (i.e., the buyer), but the U.C.C. treats a writing signed by
the dealer as sufficient to make an oral agreement to purchase securities enforceable if the

buyer does not object within a specified number of days after its receipt. See, e.g., N.Y.
U.C.C. LAw § 8-319 (McKinney 1990). As a result, sellers have a strong incentive to mail
a confirmation of sale.
54. See 15 U.S.C. § 77g(a) (1994).
55. Id. See also id. § 77j(a)(4) (1994) (authorizing Commission to omit information
from prospectus that it determines "as not being necessary or appropriate in the public interest

or for the protection of investors").
56. The SEC has already begun to accept this technique. See Joseph McLaughlin, SEC
Approves Use of ElectronicProspectusesand ProposesT+3 Relief, INSIGHTS, Apr. 1995,

at3.
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filings so incorporated by reference.' The result is an uncertain tradeoff:
Although the issuer obtains instant access to the capital markets, any issuance of securities under a shelf registration statement creates Section 11 strict
liability for the issuer and negligence liability for its directors and senior
executives. Given such liability, issuers might prefer either to issue debt
securities, which carry little practical risk of liability, rather than equity
securities, for which the litigation risk is substantial, or to issue equity
securities only under some statutory or jurisdictional exemption from registration. As a matter of social policy, however, such an incentive initially
seems perverse, because it leads to debt-laden, riskier capital structures or
to less disclosure to the market.
Can this problem be solved administratively? To a limited degree, the
SEC might be able to reduce the scope of the registration statement and
thereby minimize Section 11 liability. Section 7(a) of the '33 Act permits
the Commission to exempt some categories of information from the registration statement "if it finds that the requirement of such information ...is

inapplicable to such class and that disclosure fully adequate for the protection
of investors is otherwise required to be included within the registration
statement.""8 This exemptive authority might permit the Commission to
exclude some categories of information from the registration statements, but
the language of Section 7(a) does not give the Commission unlimited flexibility. For example, any attempt to reduce the registration statements based
on the above quoted language from Section 7(a) must meet Section 7(a)'s
express condition that the Commission, in waiving any item on Schedule A,
find "that disclosure fully adequate for the protection of investors is otherwise required to be included within the registration statement. '' 59 In
addition, Section 12(2) of the '33 Act also clouds the picture, because it
focuses on the disclosure actually given to the investor, instead of simply the
contents of the registration statement.
To sum up, the Commission could deem a confirmation of sale that
incorporates all '34 Act filings to constitute a prospectus, thereby eliminating
any meaningful prospectus delivery requirement; could specify that shelf
registration statements would become effective upon filing without staff
review; and could exclude some limited kinds of information from the
57. But see infra text accompanying notes 60-67.
58. 15 U.S.C. § 77g(a) (1994). Also, both § 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. § 77d(4) (1994), and Regulation S,17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-230.904 (1995) provide
obvious means by which to outflank § 11 liability.
59. See 15 U.S.C. § 77g(a) (1994). Thus, the Commission cannot simply define the
registration statement to be co-extensive with the Form 10-K and include nothing else.
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registration statement. However, it cannot shrink the registration statement
so that it need not include clearly material information. These changes
would give issuers instantaneous access to the capital markets, but liability
concerns would remain. Section 11 is not easily outflanked, and Section 12(2) liability might also dissuade underwriters, from relying on a
scaled-back, minimalist registration statement.
D. Ambiguities in Shelf Registration
Although shelf registration of equity in "at the market" offerings has
now been permissible for over a decade, some important ambiguities about
its operation still remain. In particular, there is uncertainty about the meaning of "incorporation by reference." Item 12 to Form S-3 states that the
prospectus incorporates all reports filed by the issuer pursuant to the '34 Act
and "all documents subsequently filed by the registrant pursuant to Sections
13(a), 13(c), 14 or 15(d) of the Exchange Act prior to the termination of the
offering. "I But what does this mean? Some practitioners argue that "incorporation by reference" of '34 Act filings means only that such documents are
incorporated into the prospectus and so carry Section 12(2) liability, but,
with the exception of the Form 10-K, are not incorporated into the registration statement, in which event they would also carry Section 11 liability.6"
Their position rests on the fact that, after the effectiveness of the registration
statement, only the subsequent filing of a Form 10-K is deemed an actual
amendment to the registration statement, which changes the effective date of
the registration statement.6' Section 11(a) of the '33 Act indicates that
Section 11 liability arises with respect to "any part of the registration statement" only as of the time "when such part became effective. "1 This language therefore makes it necessary to find that the registration statement
somehow "became effective" as to the subsequent '34 Act filing as of the
date of its filing before Section 11 liability can logically attach to this filing.
Historically, only a post-effective amendment to the registration statement
was deemed to change the time of its effectiveness.
60.

See Item 12 to Form S-3, 17 C.F.R. § 239.13 (1995).

61.

For this suggestion, see William J. Williams, Jr., Problems in the Application of

the Securities Act of 1933 and Rules Thereunder to Shelf Offerings, in 14TH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 293, 297 (1982).
62. See Item 512(b) to Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.512(b) (1995). The point of
Item 512(b) is to restart the statute of limitations under § 13 of the '33 Act so that it cannot
run before the actual offering is accomplished, which in its absence would be a possibility.
63. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1995). In short, the argument runs that for a post-effective
statement or filing to carry § 11 liability, there must be a new effective date.
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In truth, however, incorporation by reference is neither fish nor fowl.
The traditional practice with respect to most post-effective date developments
has been to insert a "sticker" or prospectus supplement into the prospectus,
instead of filing a post-effective amendment to the registration statement,
unless the change was truly fundamental in character.'" Clearly, such
stickers do not carry Section 11 liability. By analogy, proponents of this
view argue that documents incorporated by reference also should not trigger
Section 11 unless the registration statement is amended at the time they are
filed, which would give rise to a new effective date.65
This position oversimplifies, however, particularly in view of Rule 439,
which refers to all subsequently filed documents as incorporated into the
registration statement, not the prospectus.' In addition, Regulation S-K
clearly expresses the view that periodic reports filed under the '34 Act are
a substitute for the post-effective amendments that would otherwise be
necessary to reflect "a fundamental change in the information set forth in the
registration. "I This equivalence between periodic reports and post-effective
amendments suggests that both were intended to carry Section 11 liability.
Nonetheless, the SEC's rules are imprecise. Prior to the advent of shelf
registration, incorporation by reference inherently referred to previously
filed documents, which were deemed to be part of the registration statement
as of the time of its effectiveness and so carried Section 11 liability. With
the advent of shelf registration for "at the market" offerings, the staff failed
to clarify that documents incorporated by reference into the registration
statement, not simply the prospectus, would carry Section 11 liability. As
Rule 439 implies, each subsequently filed '34 Act filing should be viewed

64. See Item 512(a)(1)(ii) to Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.512(a)(1)(ii) (1995).
65. Under Rule 424, prospectus supplements and stickers must be filed with the SEC
within a specified number of days following their first use after effectiveness. See Rule
424(b)(4), (c), 17 C.F.R. § 230.424(b)(4), (c) (1995). Rule 424 does not deem the sticker
or supplement to be part of the registration statement.

66. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.439 (1995). Rule 439 states in part that where material is to
be incorporated by reference into the registration statement, such as subsequent '34 Act
filings, and filed written consent is required, such consent shall be filed as an amendment
to the registration statement. Id. Because Rule 439 speaks of documents being incorporated

into the registration statement, instead of simply into the prospectus, it implies that such
documents are to carry § 11 liability. Note also that the instruction to Item 12 to Form
S-3 specifically states: "Attention is directed to Rule 439 regarding consent to use of material incorporated by reference." Item 12 to Form S-3, 17 C.F.R. § 239.13 (1995). The
SEC normally uses consents to document that the consenting person has accepted § 11
liability.
67. Item 512(a)(1)(ii) to Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.512(a)(1)(ii) (1995).
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as the equivalent of an amendment, although not one that starts the statute
of limitations over, except in the case of the Form 10-K.
Still, there is a potential gap here and a need to clarify the nature of
liability for documents incorporated by reference. If a '34 Act filing were
incorporated only into the prospectus and not into the registration statement,
the consequence would be Section 12(2) liability, but not Section 11 liability,
with regard to the incorporated document. Because Section 12(2) applies
only to persons in privity with the issuer and those who solicit the sale,6" a
consequence could be that the issuer might escape liability under the '33 Act.
E. A Public Policy Perspective:How FarShould IntegrationGo?
The case for company registration is not unanswerable. Potentially
countervailing concerns suggest that pursuit of integration between the '33
and '34 Acts will be costly to some investors. At least three such concerns
need to be answered before the '33 Act can be safely dismantled for
seasoned issuers. First, a plausible case can be made for transaction-specific
disclosure aimed at the individual investor, at least with respect to major
securities issuances. Second, dismantling '33 Act disclosure may also
undercut and eliminate the underwriter's role as a "gatekeeper" (or third
party enforcer) by eliminating any realistic opportunity for the underwriter
to engage in due diligence. Third, facilitating direct issuer access to the
market may produce changes in market structure, including direct issuer
penetration of the secondary market. Whether these changes would be
desirable requires some analysis.
1. The Limited Casefor '33 Act Disclosure
Even once a company has become subject to the '34 Act, two distinct
arguments can be made for the continued relevance of the '33 Act's disclosure system. First, "transaction specific" disclosures may sometimes be
necessary because they represent material information that has not been
previously released pursuant to the '34 Act's continuous disclosure system.
Second, disclosure to the individual investor is desirable to the extent that the
individual investor needs unique information for his own subjective evaluation, which he cannot gain from even an efficient market's reaction to the
issuer's disclosures. However, these concerns justify at most only modest
inroads upon the concept of company registration.
68. See Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988) (holding that only persons who solicit sales
in order to serve financial interests of seller or personal financial interests are liable under

§ 12).
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"Transaction-specific" disclosure is desirable when the issuance of
securities fundamentally changes the capital structure of the corporation and
thereby renders existing '34 Act filings out of date. For example, a
corporation could have filed its most recent Form 10-Q several months ago.
Informed only to this extent, investors would have no ability to understand
or appraise the significance of the facts that the current transaction would
fundamentally alter the corporation's debt-equity ratio, that the proceeds
would be used to enter an entirely new line of business, or that most of the
shares being sold belonged to insiders who seemed to be bailing out of the
corporation. In short, past '34 Act filings alone do not describe a changing
corporation, and a corporation issuing securities is typically a changing corporation.
This argument can be addressed in a variety of ways. For example, a
new '34 Act filing (perhaps a Form 8-K) could be required whenever new
material developments had transpired or would be caused by the offering.
This new filing could be made on the eve of the offering and would then be
incorporated by reference on the one-page confirmation of sale, which would
also constitute the statutory prospectus. Thus, it would still be possible to
reduce the prospectus to a one-page document.
A stronger case can be made for disclosure aimed at the individual
investor to the extent that investor attitudes toward risk are necessarily subjective. Disclosure to the individual investor is necessary, even in an
efficient market that has absorbed and impounded all information into price,
because the taste for risk is personal, whereas the market's reaction is risk
neutral. A risk averse investor may wish to avoid high-risk stocks even if
they are efficiently priced to reflect their value to a basically risk-neutral
market. For example, both a conservative low-growth, low-risk public
utility and a high-growth, high-risk "biotech" stock with only a fifty percent
chance of surviving the next three years could trade at $50 per share. In
neither case does the market price fully impound the significance of the
security's risk to investors who have either a taste for risk or, more likely,
an aversion to it. To be sure, bond rating agencies concisely provide such
risk information in the case of debt securities in an easily digestible form
(i.e., a bond rating between "AAA" to "BB") that could be set forth even on
a single-page prospectus. However, in the case of equity securities some
substitute is necessary to provide a fuller sense of the risk-return profile of
the company, even in an efficient market.
Valid as this argument may be in theory, it probably requires no more
than a modest adjustment in the company registration scheme. Seasoned
issuers are typically not high-risk stocks and the investor can consult the
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company's publicly available annual report to gain a sense of the riskiness
of most seasoned issuers. Moreover, the sale of equity tends to reduce risk,
not increase it. Thus, the risk-averse investor is really exposed only if the
risk level has changed significantly and recently. Relatively few offerings
will change the issuer's risk level in such a manner as to necessitate individualized disclosure under the foregoing premises, but some indication of any
significant deterioration in the company's risk level might be the one item
of substantive information that should be contained on even a condensed onepage prospectus.
2. The Underwriteras Gatekeeper
Reducing the '33 Act also inevitably reduces the role of the underwriter. In a compressed time period, the underwriter cannot conduct the
same "due diligence" investigation that the '33 Act intended in its provision
for a "due diligence" affirmative defense to civil liability under Sections 11
and 12(a). This point was elaborately debated when the SEC adopted Rule
415 in 1983. One side argued that underwriter due diligence was not worth
its cost; thus, the SEC should exempt underwriters from their due diligence
obligations for "all offerings into an efficient market."69 Taking a broader
view of the market, the other side saw due diligence as producing a real
societal benefit: reduced agency costs. By increasing the accuracy of individual securities prices, due diligence "influences the decisions of corporate
management in ways that increase the efficiency with which scarce resources
are allocated. "70

Who is right? Much depends on one's view of what the market is supposed to accomplish. From a simple portfolio perspective, investors do not
necessarily benefit from due diligence because; although it may improve the
accuracy of the prices of individual securities, any inaccuracies tend to
cancel out at the portfolio level. Thus, skeptics of due diligence argue that
investors, who typically hold diversified portfolios of securities and not just
individual stocks, would not want to expend real resources just to adjust the
relative values of stocks in their portfolios. Proponents of due diligence
69. See Barbara A. Banoff, Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient Markets, and Shelf
Registration:An Analysis of Rule 415, 70 VA. L. REV. 135, 184 (1984). Professor Banoff
argues that if "investors were given a choice, they would not pay underwriters a premium to

insure them against company-specific risk." Id. at 183. This argument is, of course, based
on an assumption that investors are diversified, because company-specific risk tends to cancel
out at the portfolio level.
70. Merritt B. Fox, Shelf Registration, Integrated Disclosure, and UndenvriterDue

Diligence:An Economic Analysis, 70 VA. L. REV. 1005, 1010 (1984).
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reply that changing the price of a stock disciplines its management and
increases efficiency across the portfolio.
This latter view sees the securities market not simply as a fair game or
as an attempt to achieve a portfolio rate of return, but as a lever by which to
increase corporate efficiency. Due diligence then not only makes securities
pricing more accurate, but over the long run disciplines management and
fosters corporate accountability.7 1 From this perspective, an underwriter is

more than a risk-bearing financial intermediary who helps effect the
distribution of securities to the market. Rather, the underwriter is a
disciplinary force - a "gatekeeper."' Interestingly, modem scholarship on
underwriters has emphasized that their real function is less risk-bearing indeed, they take little risk because they typically have commitments for
their allotments before they buy them - than certification of the integrity of
the offering.73 That is, by its association with a securities offering, a high
prestige underwriter places its "seal of approval" on the offering. In "law
and economics" shorthand, the underwriter pledges its reputational capital
and thereby becomes a reputational intermediary.
Yet, it is exactly this role that is eclipsed as the '33 Act's disclosure
system is dismantled in favor of the '34 Act's continuous disclosure system.
If issuers are permitted to issue securities based only on a "notice" filing,
there would be little justification for retaining the provision in current Rule
415 that requires the issuer in a shelf registration to use an underwriter in an
"at the market offering" of equity securities.74 If such a requirement ever
made sense, it no longer does once the underwriter is not in a position to
conduct due diligence.
When Rule 415 was adopted in 1983, the same arguments were made
that due diligence would be eclipsed by shelf registration. The SEC responded with the claim that advance due diligence could be performed by
underwriter's counsel. Although there have been no memorable scandals in
the dozen years during which shelf registration has been in force, it is clear
71. See id. at 1018-22; see also Paul G. Mahoney, MandatoryDisclosureas a Solution
to Agency Problems, 62 U. CI. L. REV. 1047, 1105-11 (1995).

72. See Reinier H. Kraakman, CorporateLiability Strategies and the Costs of Legal
Control, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 890-91 (1984). As a definitional matter, the "gatekeeper" must
not have a large financial stake in the success of the offering or venture, but must be subject
to special, and usually statutory, liabilities that give this person a strong incentive to monitor

for law violations by others and little incentive to cheat itself.
73.

See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market

Efficiency, 70 VA. L. Rv. 549, 613-21 (1984).
74.

See Rule 415(a)(4)(iii), 17 C.F.R. § 230.415(a)(4)(iii) (1995).
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today that advance due diligence, at least by disinterested persons, is more
the exception than the rule. Even when such investigation occurs, the
reputational capital involved may be more that of the law firm, serving as
agent of the underwriter, than that of the underwriter, as principal. Perhaps
irretrievably, underwriters have lost their role as reputational intermediaries
in shelf registrations. Indeed, shelf registration has encouraged the growth
of a new distribution technique - the "bought deal," which is in reality a
more or less direct sale from the issuer to a group of institutions that
involves only a token role for the underwriter.7 5
The actual experience with Rule 415 has, however, resulted in a puzzle.
Despite the quick market access and obvious cost savings made possible by
the rule, equity shelf registration remains rare.76 Some explain this
phenomenon in terms of the market's greater negative reaction to the
announcement of a shelf offering, which negative reaction, they believe,
exceeds the cost savings from the rule. 7 Because investors tend to perceive
the announcement of an equity offering to signal that the issuer's stock is
probably overpriced, the role of underwriters in such a context is to certify
that the post-offering announcement corrected market price is accurate in
light of management's implicit concession that the prior market price was
excessive. As a repeat player who has both reputational interests and high
liability, it can potentially provide a credible certification to this effect. But,
it can do this less well in the shelf registration context, where it cannot
perform a meaningful due diligence investigation. Hence, its lesser ability
to provide a credible certification in this context arguably leads to a more
negative market reaction, which chills the use of the shelf registration
vehicle for equity offerings.7" "Bought deals," however, survive because the
institutional buyers in them can directly negotiate with the issuer for con75.

See RICHARD W.

JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATER-

584-85 (1992) (describing "bought deal").
76. See David J. Denis, Shelf Registration and the Marketfor Seasoned Equity Offerings, 64 J. Bus. 189, 191-95 (1991). Indeed, such offerings have decreased since the initial
period following Rule 415's adoption. Id. at 190.
77. Id. at 197-98.
78. See David W. Blackwell, ShelfRegistration and the Reduced Due DiligenceArgument: Implications of the UnderwriterCertification.and the Implicit Insurance Hypothesis, 25
J. FIN. AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 245, 250-58 (1990) (providing view that market reaction is more negative in response to equity shelf registration statement and that this causes
issuer to prefer traditional distribution techniques). Others argue that this market reaction
results in a premium charged by the underwriters that exceeds the protection they provide
investors. See David M. Greene, Comment, Due Diligence Under Rule 415: Is the Insurance
Worth the Premium?, 38 EMORY L.J. 793 (1989).
IALS
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tractual covenants and other assurances that protect them at least as well as
the underwriters' reputational pledge.
All in all, this evidence suggests that it is costly to structure the system
so that no one is well positioned to perform the certification function. If
underwriters cannot do it within the time constraints they are given, other
reputational intermediaries need to be identified and their services induced.
This is a topic to which we will return shortly.
3. Market Structure
When shelf registration was first proposed in the early 1980s, it nearly
foundered on the fear of underwriters and broker-dealers that it would disrupt and revise the structure of the securities markets in a manner adverse
to them. A variety of concerns were raised: Issuers might sell their equity
securities directly to the specialists on the stock exchange, thereby resulting
in a de facto merger of the primary and secondary markets; small, regional
underwriters would be excluded from the underwriting process because there
would not be time to assemble the traditional large selling group; and
individual investors would be excluded from primary offerings via shelf
registration for similar reasons because underwriters would find it quicker
and easier to sell to institutions in "bought deals."79 In all likelihood, shelf
registration probably has encouraged greater concentration within the securities industry, but few seem alarmed about this tendency in what is clearly a
very competitive marketplace.
Arguably, the fears expressed in the early 1980s now look more like
self-interested rationalizations than prophetic warnings. From this perspective, the greater danger may be that company registration will provide the
opportunity for rent-seeking by highly organized special interests. To a
degree, this already happened when shelf registration was originally adopted.
Rule 415 requires that an "at the market offering" be "sold through an
underwriter," thereby precluding direct issuer sales to institutional investors. I With some justification, a cynic could describe this requirement
as a full-employment act for underwriters, who otherwise were prepared to
fight the adoption of shelf registration vehemently. Indeed, it is particularly
79. Many of these concerns were voiced by then-SEC Commissioner Barbara Thomas
in her dissent to the shelf registration release. See Delayed or Continuous Offering and Sale
of Securities, Securities Act Release No. 6423, [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.

(CCH) 83,250, at 85,281-84 (Sept. 2, 1982) (dissent of Commissioner Thomas). For a
differing view, see Banoff, supra note 69, at 145-54.
80. See Rule 415(a)(4)(iii), 17 C.F.R. § 230.415(a)(4)(iii) (1995).
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hard to justify the mandatory presence of an underwriter when shelf
registration almost by definition eliminates any opportunity for them to play
a meaningful gatekeeper role.
The counterargument to this rent-seeking hypothesis starts from the
limited use still made of shelf registration for equity offerings. Arguably,
the market fears something and, unless its fears are assuaged, the greater
negative stock price reaction to a shelf registration will cause issuers to stick
to traditional distribution techniques. From this perspective, there is a
market demand for due diligence and for a gatekeeping role for underwriters
that current institutional arrangements are not satisfying.
What would solve this need? Some have argued that a brief pause
between the announcement of the offering and actual sales thereunder would
provide time for due diligence."1 But, while such prior announcement would
alert the market, it might be too little time for meaningful due diligence;
indeed, the required announcement might only make certain that the market
would note and respond negatively to the offering. The greater need may be
for an institutional structure in which institutional purchasers can directly
negotiate with the issuer for contractual protections and assurances. Possibly, the requirement in Rule 415 that the underwriter act as a principal may
interfere with such direct negotiations.' In any event, for whatever reason,
such direct negotiations appear to occur only in transactions that are sold
privately, even if, as in PIPE transactions, they are later publicly registered
for resale.
IV. The Problem of Liability
What if the SEC gave a party and no one came? This is a critical
dilemma in formulating a company registration model because, so long as it
is voluntary, there is a significant risk that companies may decline to elect
into it. For example, if a "universal" company registration model were but
one option among several, with existing Form S-3 being another, and if the
election of company registration precluded a company from relying on
existing exemptions (such as the private placement and Regulation S exemptions), many companies might well decide to remain with the existing Form
S-3 and not accept any "universal" registration system that chilled their
ability to make exempt offerings.
81. See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly
Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 823 (1985) (proposing one
or two day "cooling off' period between announcement and sales).

82. See Rule 415(a)(4)(ii), 17 C.F.R. 230.415(a)(4)(ii) (1995).
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Initially, issuers' primary concern with company registration might be
the risk of '33 Act liabilities. Today, in a private placement or in a Regulation S extraterritorial offering, the issuer may face liability under Rule
lOb-5, but need not fear liability under Sections 11 or 12(2) of the '33 Act."
Equally important, its officers and directors face very little prospect of
liability on any basis because of the effective abolition of "aiding and
abetting" liability by the Supreme Court in its 1994 CentralBank decision."
In contrast, in a registered offering, Section 1l's applicability means that the
issuer faces strict liability and its directors and principal officers confront
vicarious liability under a statutory system that shifts the burden of proving
nonnegligence to them as an affirmative defense. As a result, the unfortunate choice today may be between too much liability under Section 11 and
too little liability in a private placement subject only to Rule 10b-5. 8s
A plausible rebuttal can be framed to this claim that the threat of
Section 11 liability will deter issuers from adopting a company registration
system: Namely, the issuer fares no better in private placements. That is,
in private transactions, the institutional purchasers extract elaborate covenants and detailed representations and warranties from the issuer during
long and intensive negotiations; collectively, these private terms leave the
issuer in about the same position as if it were strictly liable under Section 11
for any material misstatement or omission. True as this may sometimes
be, this response is incomplete in two respects. First, even if the issuer,
itself, faces the equivalent of strict liability in private deals because of
contractual covenants, its officers and directors do not; their exposure is
much greater in registered transactions. Second, issuers do escape strict
liability in some unregistered deals. Both Regulation S and Rule 144A
provide examples, because these transactions are typically underwritten, with
the underwriter buying from the issuer on a firm commitment basis and
reselling to institutional purchasers. In such underwritten deals, no direct

83. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1065-71 (1995) (implying that
§ 12(2) does not apply to private placement offering brochures or documents other than

prospectus contained in registration statement filed with SEC).
84. See Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1445-55 (1994).
85. Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1995), may actually create a disincentive
that deters issuers and others from engaging in due diligence. Because its scienter requirement requires at least proof of recklessness, the defendant who is ignorant - even as a result
of gross negligence - is in theory safe, while the defendant who conducts a factual investigation and learns from it enough to be deemed consciously aware of a material risk of
inaccuracy may be far more exposed. Perversely, under such a structure, ignorance becomes

bliss.
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privity exists between the issuer and the institutional investors who buy its
securities.
Puzzling as it may be that the formal structure of the transaction determines the issuer's actual liability, the net result is nonetheless that the issuer
has an incentive to prefer private deals, in which its liability is less. A
possible explanation for this puzzle may be that in private transactions the
purchaser, or its agents, has a greater opportunity to conduct "hands-on" due
diligence and to receive private information (forecasts, estimates, and valuations) that the issuer would feel uncomfortable including in a registration
statement. This greater opportunity for verification and forward-looking
information may be more important to some investors than the differential
in liability rules between private and public transactions. Indeed, the recent
popularity of PIPE transactions - in which an issuer places equity securities
privately with institutional investors but agrees to register immediately their
stock for resale under a shelf registration statement86 - could be evidence
of this preference. If so, the bottom line is that there may be multiple incentives leading issuers today to use private markets - and thus to be reluctant
to adopt a system that requires them to forego such use.
What policy responses therefore make sense? On the simplest level,
proposals to curb the severity of Section 1l's in terrorem threat are at least
reasonably related to the need to make company registration more attractive
to seasoned issuers. Once again, however, the chief problem lies in how far
the SEC can go in this direction in the absence of legislation. Presumably,
any SEC proposal to soften Section 11 would focus on outside directors,
rather than the issuer, insiders, or underwriters. Those who have studied
securities litigation report an uneasy sense that settlements occur on a basis
that is unrelated to the actual merits of the litigation, apparently, they believe, because of the risk aversion of individual defendants.' Even if these
assessments have sometimes been overstated, such risk aversion is perfectly
rational and should be most pronounced in the case of the outside directors.
If directors face personal liability which they can escape by causing the
corporation to reach a settlement with the plaintiff's attorneys (which
settlement need not benefit shareholders), it is perfectly rational in economic
terms for defendant directors to use the shareholders' money to settle their
own personal liabilities - even when the risk of liability is modest, at least
if we assume that the directors are not substantial shareholders in the cor86. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (explaining PIPE transactions).
87. See Janet C. Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. Rav. 497, 566-68 (1991).
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poration.1 The result could be that high potential liability for directors may
produce excessive litigation that does not advance, and may injure, shareholder interests. Of course, the optimal level of liability is difficult to
prescribe in theory and probably impossible to specify in practice.
Nonetheless, there is at least a plausible case for mitigating the liability
of directors and an even higher probability that, absent such an effort, company registration will prove unattractive to many companies. What can be
done in practical terms? When the SEC first implemented integrated disclosure, it made a valiant but seemingly futile effort in adopting Rule 176. Essentially, Rule 176 identifies a limited number of factors that constitute
"relevant circumstances" for the purpose of determining whether a defendant
has satisfied the "due diligence" defense provided by Section 11(b)(3) of the
'33 Act.89 At best, Rule 176 is an ineffective provision, which appears
never to have produced a pre-trial dismissal in a reported case since its adoption more than a decade ago.' °
Still, Rule 176 could be strengthened. Unfortunately, there seems no
way to shift the burden to the plaintiffs on due diligence because the burden
is specified by the statute itself. Nonetheless, one possibility is to accord
outside directors a reliance defense resembling that under state law where a
committee of directors - possibly the audit committee or a subcommittee
thereof - has attempted to verify the adequacy and accuracy of the company's '34 Act filings.9 ' Such a defense would be available to the other
88. As defendants become larger shareholders, they bear more of the cost of a
corporate-funded recovery. Even as a group, directors are usually not substantial shareholders in a seasoned S-3 level company. In contrast, they may be in IPOs, and thus this

justification does not apply as well in that context.
89. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.176 (1995). For the release proposing Rule 176, see
Treatment of Information Incorporated by Reference Into Registration Statements, Securities
Act Release No. 6335, 1981 WL 31062 (Aug. 6, 1981).
90. I base this statement on a word search of "Rule 176" in the LEXIS "Genfed" and
"Fedsec" libraries. It is, of course, possible that there are unreported decisions involving
Rule 176 or decisions not picked up by LEXIS.
91. In some state jurisdictions, the reliance defense has been codified in the state
corporations code. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 715(h) (McKinney 1986); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (Michie 1991); REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.42(b)
(Comm. on Corp. Laws, Am. Bar Ass'n, Supp. 1995). The reliance defense has long been
recognized by the case law. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS

§ 4.02 (Am. Law Inst. 1994); Spirt v. Bechtel, 232 F.2d 241, 247 (2d

Cir. 1956); Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1174-75 (Del. 1995).
Reliance, of course, must be reasonable to be protected, and it must be in good faith. The
reliance defense is today partially recognized by Rule 176(f), which does not, however, refer
to board committees. 17 C.F.R. § 230.176(f) (1995).
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directors even if the "due diligence" actually performed was inadequate; the
issue rather would be the reasonableness of the delegation of authority and
the absence of evidence from which these directors should have inferred that
adequate efforts were not being made.
Grafting such a "reasonable reliance" defense onto Section 1 l(b)(3) is,
however, a delicate matter because the "due diligence" defense provided in
that section requires not only that the director have a "reasonable ground to
believe" in the accuracy of the registration statement's factual statements, but
that the individual director conducted a "reasonable investigation" in reaching that conclusion.' In short, some inquiry must have been made by the
outside director; good faith alone is not enough. Possibly, however, the
defense could be crafted so that the outside directors would receive annual
or periodic reports from the auditors, outside counsel, and the disclosure
committee about their activities in verifying the company's interim '34 Act
filings. Such an inquiry could be defined by the SEC to constitute a
"reasonable investigation" in the absence of contrary information.
A related and supplementary protection would be to state expressly in
Rule 176 that the size of the offering is a factor to be considered in evaluating the adequacy of due diligence efforts. 93 Put simply, cost considerations
cannot be ignored in this context.
Even if such an updated and revised "due diligence" defense were
adopted, it is uncertain whether it would be sufficiently attractive to issuers
to lead them to adopt company registration. First, the issuer still has strict
liability under Section 11. Second, some outside directors would have to
serve on this special committee and they might perceive their role to resemble that of sacrificial lambs for the rest of the board. In truth, however, this
proposal is more than a cosmetic defense - it is an attempt to institutionalize
a permanent "due diligence" organ within any corporation that elects a
company registration model. In this light, its most basic premise is that
specialization is necessary if the modem board of directors is to be able to
meet the standards specified for due diligence in the '33 Act. Of course,
such a committee would be voluntary and not mandatory, but those corporations that did not create such an organ would receive only the very modest,
and probably negligible, protections of current Rule 176.
92. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (1994).
93. This suggestion was made as a formal recommendation at the Fifth Annual
Government-Business Forum on Small Business Capital Formation in 1987, but was never
acted upon by the SEC. See Fifth Annual Government-Business Forum, Securities Act
Release No. 6689, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,102, at 88,520
(Feb. 6, 1987).
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V. An Alternative Approach: Deregulatingthe
Private PlacementExemption
A. The Uncertain Tradeoff Between Liability and Illiquidity
Faced with a substantial prospect of liability under the '33 Act if it
makes a public offering of its equity securities, an issuer that is eligible to
use company registration will predictably compare the costs and risks of a
public offering under the '33 Act against those of the most logical alternatives: a private placement or some other exempt offering such as an extraterritorial offering under Regulation S. The comparison may well be a close
one, in part because of a factor not yet assessed. Although an issuer who
conducts a private placement in conformity with Regulation D or an extraterritorial offering under Regulation S thereby avoids the prospect, of
potential liability under both Section 11 and Section 12(2), 4 the use of these
exemptions is not costless to the issuer. In each case, the buyer must accept
a period of illiquidity before it can resell the securities purchased in a private
placement or Regulation S offering in the U.S. secondary markets. Consequently, there is usually an illiquidity discount that the issuer of privately
placed securities bears. The resulting trade-off between liability and illiquidity seems uncertain.
Once, when privately placed securities could not be safely resold for a
period of three years or more, this discount was substantial. With the adoption of Rule 144, however, the period of illiquidity was reduced to two
years 9 and the discount has correspondingly shrunk. In 1995, the Commission proposed to reduce the holding period under Rule 144 from two years
to one year for non-affiliates of the issuer.96 If this proposal is adopted, the
illiquidity discount will shrink even further. In consequence, private placements may become an even more attractive alternative.
If the Commission wished to reduce the size of the illiquidity discount,
there is an obvious policy prescription by which it could do so. Under Rule
144A, certain institutional purchasers of privately placed securities, known
94. Until recently, private placements were subject to § 12(2). However, in Gustafson
v. Aloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1063 (1995), the Supreme Court found that § 12(2) applies
only to the prospectus contained within the registration statement.
95. See Rule 144(d)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d)(1) (1995). Moreover, the current
holding period allows a holder of the restricted securities to "tack" the holding periods of
earlier holders of the same security, who have made private sales to such person.
96. See Revision of Holding Period Requirements in Rule 144, Securities Act Release
No. 7187, [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,638, at 86,882 (June 27,
1995).
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as "Qualified Institutional Buyers" (QIBs), can freely trade restricted
securities among themselves.' As a result, when equity securities are sold
to QIBs, there is believed to be little or no discount because the buyers do
not truly accept any significant period of illiquidity. However, not all equity
securities qualify for Rule 144A. Surprisingly, small non-reporting U.S.
firms and foreign issuers can use Rule 144A, but not domestic companies
that have a similar class of equity securities listed on a stock exchange or
NASDAQ.98 Known as the "fungibility" exclusion, this rule has the paradoxical effect of permitting secondary trading among QIBs in non-public
companies, about whom there is little current information publicly available,
but precluding such trading in cases where precisely such information is
available.
On its face this seems backward: Securities in a high-risk venture capital
company can today freely trade among QIBs, but not the common stock of
IBM, G.M. or AT&T. Liberalized secondary trading of restricted securities
seems most appropriate in the case of seasoned companies about whom
abundant information is publicly available. The SEC has taken this contrary
and illogical position basically because the SEC fears the creation of shadow
private markets in which securities that are also traded in public would trade
at lower prices.99 Politically, it could embarrass the SEC if a class of securities could be purchased by QIBs at a lower price in private markets than the
public investor could buy in the public markets. Allegations might then be
raised of favoritism. Also, the stock exchanges, a powerful interest group,
opposed extending Rule 144A to publicly traded securities for fear of losing
illiquidity in transactions from their markets." ° Thus, to protect itself, the
97. See Rule 144A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1995). The definition of "qualified
institutional buyer" is in Rule 144A(a)(1) and requires the institution to own and invest on a

discretionary basis at least $100 million in securities that are not affiliated with the institution.
Id. § 230.144A(a)(1).
98. See Rule 144A(d)(3)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(d)(3)() (1995). For an explanation
of the Commission's rationale, see Resale of Restricted Securities, Securities Act Release No.
6839, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,427, at 80,221 (July 11, 1989)
(discussing fears that "side-by-side" public and private markets would develop, but indicating
Commission's view that this development was "unlikely").
99. See Resale of Restricted Securities, Securities Act Release No. 6839, [1989
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,427, at 80,221 (July 11, 1989).
100. In contrast, NASDAQ established "The Portal Market" to trade restricted securities
eligible for Rule 144A. Between its inception in June 1990 and August 1994, NASDAQ has
processed over 1,000 applications for listing in Portal. See Rule Change Relating to Security
Application Fee for the Portal Market, Exchange Act Release No. 34,562, 1994 WL 466868,
at *3 (Aug. 19, 1994).
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SEC made Rule 144A available only for securities that do not trade in
public markets. This restriction prevents arbitrage between these two markets with institutions buying low in private markets and reselling high in
public ones.
Still, the SEC's underlying scenario is flawed. The perceived unfair
advantage that QIBs receive by being able to buy more cheaply in private
markets results chiefly from the fact that they also bear a period of illiquidity. In general, the greater or lesser the liquidity restriction imposed by law,
the greater or lesser the price discount that institutions will demand and
receive from issuers. Thus, if this period of illiquidity were reduced, the
illiquidity discount would also predictably decline and the gap between the
public and private prices would'largely close in the case of seasoned companies.' 0 ' Hence, shortening the holding period for privately placed securities under Rule 144 and rescinding Rule 144A's fungibility doctrine so as
to permit active secondary trading among QIBs, even during that reduced
holding period, might represent a very sensible public policy, at least to the
extent that it could make private markets more attractive to some issuers.
Some illiquidity discount might remain, but the higher transaction costs and
liability concerns associated with public offerings might make issuers content
to bear this discount.
In short, if the goal is to encourage capital formation, it is not selfevident that company registration will produce greater gains than those that
might result from liberalizing the private placement exemption. Company
registration has been partially in force since the early 1980s, and the marginal gains of extending it across the board today might be small. Conversely, however, the capacity of private markets to handle any sizeable
increase above the volume of equity securities that they today absorb is also
uncertain. These two alternatives - company registration and the expanded
availability of private markets - are not necessarily mutually exclusive. No
public choice is necessary between them, and both approaches could in
principle be pursued at once.
B. Curtailingthe Private PlacementExemption
Nonetheless, the predictable bureaucratic response to the possibility that
corporate issuers might prefer to use private markets than to adopt company
101. Some discount might remain to reflect the lower transaction costs in private
placements and/or the lower liability risks faced by issuers in such deals. In theory, the

issuer would pass on some of its cost savings to the investors in these transactions to induce
them to purchase in private deals.
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registration is to preclude any choice. Put simply, an eligibility condition
to company registration could be imposed that denied issuers the ability to
make private sales of equity based on statutory exemptions. Some on the
SEC Advisory Committee favor this approach, which could be enforced by
requiring those who elect company registration to forego use of statutory
exemptions, for equity sales; the penalty would be a two-year suspension of
the availability of shelf registration if this condition were violated. Once
again, however, the net result may be to make a company registration system
unattractive to most eligible issuers.
Although the SEC seemingly has the power to condition shelf registration on virtually any terms it wants that are related to the purposes of the
federal securities laws, such a draconian approach seems unwise. To begin
with, there are a variety of reasons unrelated to litigation risks or cost savings why a corporate issuer may reasonably want to make private sales. One
such example involves a company in possession of private material information about itself that it does not wish to disclose to the world for sensible
business-related reasons, but which it is willing to disclose to purchasers in
a private transaction."° Forcing such a transaction to occur under a shelf
registration statement seemingly forces the company either to disclose to the
world, in order to avoid a material misrepresentation, or to forego the transaction. No policy reason seems evident why companies should be forced to
so choose.
There is, however, a carrot as well as a stick that can be used to attract
issuers to a company registration system. Basically, a much narrower definition of "affiliate" could be adopted by the SEC with regard to issuers that
elect company registration. Under the last sentence of Section 2(11) of the
'33 Act, any person who purchases from "any person directly or indirectly
controlling or controlled by the issuer, or any person under direct or indirect
common control with the issuer" becomes an underwriter, who therefore
03
must register resales of the same securities or find a statutory exemption. 1
Thus, any "affiliate" of the issuer - including senior executives, directors
or substantial shareholders - cannot easily or safely resell securities, even
if the sale to them was registered, because their buyer becomes a statutory
underwriter. "04 The exemption usually relied upon to solve this problem is
102. An example could be information about a pending acquisition that it is making or
then negotiating, but does not wish to disclose publicly. Today, a corporation is under no

duty in most instances to disclose such negotiations, but may not misrepresent them. See
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232-33 (1988).
103. See Securities Act of 1933 § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1994).
104. The term "affiliate" is defined by Rule 405 to mean a person who controls, is con-
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that provided by Rule 144, which requires the affiliate to "trickle" his or her
shares into the market under a volume restriction.'0 5 Rule 144 solves the
problem of insider resales, but only with great complexity.
Similarly, if insiders, institutional investors or other accredited investors
purchased securities in a private placement, their ability to resell during the
two-year period in which Rule 144 keeps such "restricted securities" out of
the public markets is also uncertain. Essentially, holders of restricted securities may make private sales to other sophisticated purchasers, but this is
often a highly illiquid market.
Company registration potentially could solve both problems at a single
stroke by registering all outstanding restricted securities and all issuer
securities held by affiliates for resale. However, there are some obvious
problems in this approach. First, the company would have to pay the SEC's
registration fee and might find it difficult to recoup this amount from its
shareholders. Second, the company might not want to give this degree of
liquidity to insiders and others because it would create a substantial
"overhang" that would depress current securities prices."0 Third, and most.
serious, the company would have apparent liability under Section 11 for
sales made by affiliates and statutory underwriters under such a "resale"
registration statement. This would be particularly problematic when such
a shareholder sold into the public market at a time between the issuer's
'34 Act filings when material nonpublic information about the company
existed, which information may well not have been known to the selling
shareholder.
None of these(problems are beyond practical solution, but each requires
some complexity that detracts from the vision of a greatly streamlined and
simplified system. Resales by affiliates, for example, could be restricted to
certain "window" periods when the company had updated its financial and
other periodic disclosures. More significantly, the concept of "controlling
person" or "affiliate" could be more narrowly defined, at least for '33 Act
trolled by, or is under common control with the person specified (here, the issuer). See Rule
405, 17 C.F.R. 230.405 (1995). Even criminal penalties may be levied for a violation of the
requirement that affiliates not resell without registration or a special exemption. See, e.g.,
United States v. Wolfson, 405 F.2d 779, 782 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 946
(1969).
105. See Rule 144(e), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(e) (1995).
106. Ininitial public offerings, it is common for the underwriters to obtain commitments
from insiders that for a specified period they will not sell shares held by them in the issuer
under Rule 144, or otherwise, so as not to flood the market for the new company. Of course,
contractual restrictions would still be possible even if the shares were freed from statutory
legal restrictions.
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purposes, so that it reached only senior executives, very substantial shareholders, and those acting in concert with them. "
To sum up, some of the complexity surrounding the resale of restricted
securities and securities held by affiliates can be easily and desirably
simplified. But to do so, it is not necessary to deny issuers the availability
of the private placement exemption or to make use of that exemption costly.
Indeed, to do so may be self-defeating, because issuers might well hesitate
to use company registration if they had to forego the private placement
exemption to obtain only marginally quicker access to the market.
Overshadowing all these practical reasons, however, is a still more
important justification for the continued availability of the private placement
exemption - the rising importance of institutional investors.
C. InstitutionalInvestors as the New Gatekeepers
The possibility that institutional investors might buy in private markets
and resell in public ones has been perceived by many as a vice - indeed, as
a reason not to further liberalize Rule 144A and eliminate its "fungibility"
restriction. Yet, this possibility can equally be presented as a virtue.
Typically, those concerned about institutional resale into public markets
present it as a form of arbitrage - one under which institutional investors
obtain a special privileged status. Largely for these reasons, or for their
public relations impact, both Rule 144A and shelf registration were
modified, in the former case by the fungibility exclusion and in the latter
case by the underwriter requirement.' 08
The fear in both cases is that institutional investors will enrich themselves by playing a short-term arbitrage game, buying from the issuer at a
discount and then quickly reselling into the public markets to realize an
immediate gain. Presumably, the underlying harm to public investors in
such cases is that they are denied the opportunity to buy under the shelf
registration statement because the institutions used either their leverage or
ability to make quicker investment decisions to exclude public investors.
107. The current definitions of "affiliate" and "control" are in Rule 405 and are
sweeping. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1995). "Affiliate" might be redefined, for example,
so that only inside directors and other shareholders owning more than 20% were presumptively deemed affiliates, unless clear and convincing evidence demonstrated otherwise. There
are very different issues involved in carrying this same restricted definition over to the '34
Act context, where corporate control transactions loom larger. Thus, I urge only a narrowing
of the '33 Act's use of the term "affiliate," principally to reduce the number of persons who
can be deemed statutory underwriters for purposes of § 2(11) of the '33 Act.
108. See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
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This already happens both in registered public offerings that are essentially
"bought deals" and in PIPE transactions that begin as private placements.
Even more frequently, when an offering is oversubscribed, institutional
investors have the leverage, and it is likely to be small investors that are cut
back or excluded from an IPO. The exclusion of small investors as a result
of such an "institutionalization" of the primary offering process presents at
least a plausible scenario of harm to small investors.
However, this same scenario does not play out as logically in the private
placement context. Institutions do not exclude or "squeeze out" individual
investors from this context because individuals do not generally qualify to
participate in private placements. 1" More importantly, institutions cannot
quickly resell, but must hold for a minimum holding period of two years
(one year under a proposed rule change to Rule 144)."0 Thus, quick turnaround arbitrage is not possible and the institution must bear the economic
risk of its investment for a significant period.
As a result, institutions do engage in often significant due diligence
efforts before buying equity securities in private placements. In turn, this
means that they are in a position to play a gatekeeping role. To note this
possibility is not to predict the demise or even the gradual "withering away"
of underwriters. Underwriters will continue to sell equity securities to
institutional investors and others, but as the size of the typical deal declines,
as it should with company registration, and as the timing of transactions
becomes less predictable, the underwriters' ability and incentive to engage
in costly monitoring of the issuer will correspondingly decline. In contrast,
institutional investors are the repeat player with the stronger incentives to
monitor, and with fewer conflicts of interest with regard to the issuer to
dissuade them from doing so. Although institutions may monitor issuers in
both the public and private markets, their incentive to do so is greater in the
private market context, where their ability to exit into a public market is at
least marginally constrained."'
109. Under § 4(2) of the '33 Act, private placements may be made only to sophisticated
investors who do not stand in need of the '33 Act's protections. See SEC v. Ralston Purina,
346 U.S. 119 (1953). For the current definition of such persons as "accredited ...
investor[s]," see Rule 501(a), 17 C.F.R.§ 230.501(a) (1995).
110. Rule 144(d) requires a two-year holding period, but permits tacking between
holders so long as private sales are made. Thus the SEC has proposed to shorten this twoyear period to one year for non-affiliates. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
111. I refer here to the familiar "exit" and "voice" distinction first made by Albert
Hirschman. See ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, ExIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE
IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970) (noting two ways management learns of
problems - customers stop buying firm's goods or members quit the firm (exit), or
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More importantly, in the case of seasoned issuers, public investors can
freeride to a degree on these monitoring activities by institutional investors.
This would not be the case if institutions could immediately bail out at the
first sign of trouble and dump their shares into the market, as they can under
a company registration system; but so long as some significant period of

liquidity remains, whether two years or one, institutions that buy in private
placements have a stronger incentive to monitor and perform due diligence

investigations than those that buy otherwise equivalent securities in public
markets. To be sure, this relative illiquidity will result in some discount in
the purchase price, but the effect on the institutional investor of some modest

degree of illiquidity may have a social value that exceeds any cost or
perceived unfairness to public investors from this discount. Some informed
commentators believe excessive securities trading today wastes social
resources,
while others argue that shareholders, including institutional

investors, have a myopically short-term time horizon within which they seek
to maximize profits."' Under either diagnosis, it makes sense to encourage
institutions to buy in private markets and hold for some minimum term.

From either perspective, it is thus counterproductive to discourage private
placements by seasoned issuers.

Independent of these concerns, the possibility also arises that institutional investors may be in a position to fill precisely the due diligence void
created by the inability of underwriters to perform such a monitoring role in
customers or members express dissatisfaction to management directly or indirectly (voice));
see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The InstitutionalInvestor as Corporate
Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1277, 1342-45 (1991).
112. Proponents of the "noise trader" model argue that there is excessive securities
trading today and that, as a result, a stock transfer tax would promote overall market and
social efficiency by reducing such excessive trading. See Lawrence H. Summers & Victoria
P. Summers, When FinancialMarkets Work Too Well: A Cautious Case for a Securities
Transaction Tax, 3 J. FIN. SERVS. RES. 261 (1989); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Using Tax Policy to
Curb Speculative Short-Term Trading, 3 J. FIN. SERVS. RES. 101, 113 (1989). The case for
a transfer tax is controversial to say the least. An alternative is a legal regime in which
substantial investors have an incentive voluntarily to accept a period of illiquidity. Either
way, of course, the counter-intuitive claim is being made that it is not necessarily wise as a
matter of social policy to reduce all transaction costs and barriers to the free trading of
securities.
113. For recent critiques taking this perspective, see MICHAEL E. PORTER, CAPITAL
CHOICES: CHANGING THE WAY AMERICA INvESTS IN INDUSTRY (1992); THE REPORT OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON MARKET SPECULATION AND CORPORATE

GOVERNANCE (1992); and COMM. ON TIME HORIZONS AND TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS,
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING, TIME HORIZONS AND TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS

(1992).
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fast-paced or very small equity offerings. Realism, however, requires a
cautionary and qualifying observation. The rate of private placement activity
in equity securities has remained relatively stable for some time, 14 and the
popularity of PIPE transactions suggests that, although institutions will buy
in private markets, they still desire immediate liquidity. Hence, it is uncertain which will prove dominant: the institutions' preference for liquidity or
the issuer's preference for a reduced liability risk. All that is offered here
is the observation that a legal regime that tended to lock-in substantial and
sophisticated investors for some intermediate period of time, say one to two
years, could offer social benefits. As exit is restrained, voice is activated.
VI. Conclusion
Because this Article antedates the final report of the SEC's Advisory
Committee, it cannot offer specific criticisms (and has not sought to). However, it can offer general guidelines.
As a starting point, it agrees that administrative integration of the '33
and '34 Acts can sensibly reduce the '33 Act's requirements in the case of
seasoned issuers. However, full and functional integration probably requires
legislative action. The basic focus of the '33 Act shouldbe on the IPO and
similar transactions involving smaller issuers." 5
To the extent that the SEC pursues a voluntary company registration
model administratively, it must avoid the danger of allowing the costs associated with this option to exceed its benefits. A model that is exclusive - that
is, that denies those electing it the ability to use private placements or Regulation S for equity sales - has real costs compared with less certain benefits.
Not surprisingly, then, there are already signs that the principal constituencies affected by SEC actions are uncertain to skeptical about the benefits of
114. Investment Dealers' Digest reports annual totals in all components of the private
placement market, both debt and equity. Between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994
there were 384 private placements of "plain vanilla" equity tabulated by it, for a total

principal amount of $20,058,200,000. Over the corresponding period in 1993, there were
347 similar deals for a total principal amount of $19,281,400,000 - less than a 5%
difference. See Jeffrey Keegan, Beset by Change and Erosion, PrivatePlacements Endure,
INvEsTMENT DEALERS' DIGEST, Feb. 27, 1994, at 14, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File. Outside of the Rule 144A context, there has been some decline in traditional
private placement activity over recent years. See generally id.
115. In closing, it bears repeating what the Supreme Court has said: "[i]t is true that the
1933 Act was primarily concerned with the regulation of new offerings .... " United States
v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 777-78 (1979). The Court went on in Naftalin to observe that § 17
of the '33 Act had additional concerns, but this recognition of the '33 Act's focus should be
the starting point. Id. at 778.
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company registration. Underwriters fear it will lead to further erosion in
due diligence and their gatekeeper role, while issuers do not. like the
obligation to register sales by affiliates and the "flow back" from foreign
offerings, plus the risk of Section 11 liability. To be sure, these expressed
reservations may partially mask other concerns; for example, underwriters
may fear loss of their special relationships to their traditional issuer clients
and dislike increased competition, while issuers may simply want additional
"sweeteners." Nonetheless, they suggest a need to rethink the process of
administrative implementation.
In closing, this Article would recommend that three ground rules be
kept in mind by the SEC as it moves toward a company registration model:
1. Exclusivity is to be avoided. Company registration should be one
alternative among others on a menu of options. Rules which would attempt
to mandate that all equity sales had to be made pursuant to a "universal"
shelf registration, or that imposed some penalty on such transactions, seem
unnecessarily mandatory. Perhaps, in the light of a low-cost alternative of
company registration, private markets for equity securities will wither away
as unnecessary, but this should not be assumed. It remains a puzzle why
equity shelf registration has been unpopular, while Rule 144A offerings have
soared. But in light of this disparity, it must be recognized that private
markets may well have a survival capacity that has been underestimated.
Indeed, to the extent that gatekeepers can function well within them, they
have a positive social value.
2. The incentives to adopt company registration are questionable.
Therefore, the costs of company registration should be taxed to shelf
registrationgenerally, not to the use of any new universal shelf registration
statement. A strong case can be made for enhancements to the '34 Act's
disclosure system before issuers are given complete freedom to substitute
continuous '34 Act disclosure for transaction-specific '33 Act disclosure. In
particular, "MD&A" reporting requirements for interim periods could be
strengthened, and any specific issuance by the issuer might require a Form
8-K filing at least the day before to increase market transparency. Such a
Form 8-K requirement would both alert the market to the offering and
provide an opportunity for underwriters to discuss the adequacy of existing
disclosures with the issuer in the context of a specific filing requirement.
But to impose this obligation only on those electing company registration
would be a mistake, because it would place a regulatory tax on the new
approach and thus weaken the incentive to adopt it. Instead, such enhanced
disclosure requirements should either be imposed on all reporting companies
or, more likely, on all companies that elect to use Form S-3. Then, those
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who face the decision whether to elect company registration would not face
a close balance between its costs and benefits. Rather, the benefits would be
clear - for example, no SEC prior review of the new registration form, a
narrowed definition of "affiliate," and unlimited market access - while the
costs would already have been taxed on all firms electing any form of shelf
registration or incorporation by reference of subsequently filed '34 Act
reports. As a practical matter, this approach reduces the prospect that few
would elect company registration because they perceive its advantages over
existing forms of shelf registration to be only marginal at best.
Alternatively, a low ceiling (say two or three percent of outstanding
voting stock) could be placed on the use of shelf registration by companies
not electing into the company registration system. Thus, on this basis, election of company registration would offer an issuer greater flexibility in the
future and thus respond to the current shortfall in incentives.
3. Liability must be addressed legislatively. Although administrative
rules are possible, Section 11 needs legislative re-examination because it fits
with any system of shelf registration like the proverbial square peg with the
round hole. To be sure, Section 11 works well for IPOs and other supermaterial offerings that should command the board's attention. But, because
it requires an extraordinary and costly level of diligence by the corporation's
gatekeepers, it meshes poorly with a system in which repetitive, small equity
offerings are contemplated. Important as due diligence is, it must be proportional to the size of the offering. If legislation is sought, a basic
compromise seems desirable - Section 11 should be cut back so that it
applies primarily to IPOs and to other higher-risk issuers and probably to
very substantial offerings, but correspondingly Section 12(2) liability should
be restored to cover sales in private markets and to reach all offering materials employed by the issuer." 6 To be sure, Section 12(2) also has a due diligence defense, but its differences from Section 11 are important: (1) It does
not normally apply to secondary participants, such as officers and directors," 7 and (2) it does not impose strict liability on even the issuer, but
allows any seller to establish its due diligence defense of "reasonable care."
Such a reduced obligation seems closer to being proportional to smaller
offerings.
116. This means in substance that Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., discussed supra notes 83 and
94, should be legislatively reversed. Another desirable legislative change would be to give
the SEC statutory authority to waive the prospectus delivery requirement.
117. Persons who solicit the sale, as well as those in actual privity, have liability under
§ 12(2) of the '34 Act, at least if they do so out of financial interest. See Pinter v. Dahl, 486
U.S. 622 (1988).
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In all likelihood, the debate over company registration will be contentious. Those entering it might well begin by considering whether and why
they agree or disagree with the foregoing three generalizations.

